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Abstract
Opinions and beliefs determine the evolution of social systems. This is of particular
interest in finance, as the increasing complexity of financial systems is coupled with informa-
tion overload. Opinion formation, therefore, is not always the result of optimal information
processing. On the contrary, agents are boundedly rational and naturally tend to observe and
imitate others in order to gain further insights. Hence, a certain degree of interaction, which
can be envisioned as a network, occurs within the system. Opinions, the interaction network
and prices in financial markets are then heavily intertwined and influence one another. We
build on previous contributions on adaptive systems, where agents have hetereogenous be-
liefs, and introduce a dynamic confidence network that captures the interaction and shapes
the opinion patterns. The analytical framework we adopt for modeling the interaction is
rooted in the opinion dynamics problem. This will allow us to introduce a nonlinear model
where the confidence network, opinion dynamics and price formation coevolve in time. A
key aspect of the model is the classification of agents according to their topological role in
the network, therefore showing that topology matters in determining how of opinions and
prices will coevolve. We illustrate the dynamics via simulations, discussing the stylized facts
in finance that the model is able to capture. Last, we propose an empirical validation and
calibration scheme that makes use of social network data.
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31 Introduction
If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.
W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas (1928, p. 572)
Social systems are endogenously driven by how agents perceive, think of and, ultimately,
model the system itself. Therefore, the interpretation of a particular situation yielding to a sub-
sequent action often affects the situation. However, the interpretation is almost never objective
and carries a certain degree of subjectivity stemming from individual choices and behaviours.
This naturally reflects on the aggregate behaviour of the system. Whether accurate or not,
individual views, opinions and beliefs have consequences with a real and tangible impact on the
system. The quote reported above is also known as Thomas theorem.2 This “theorem” refers to
a broad situation where opinions determine reality and, in turn, reality shapes opinions.
This problem can be envisioned within the framework of rationality, arguably one the most
debated concepts in both social and economic theory. A “rational” – in any acceptation of
the word – agent would never act in such a way that a potential undesired consequence could
originate from the wrong definition of the situation. This idea, in the light of the current
financial crisis, is even more challenged within the standard rationality paradigm in finance, i.e.
that investors make optimal use of all available information.
The traditional financial paradigm is built upon the assumption of rationality of agents and
markets that are perfectly efficient (Fama, 1970). In the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH),
asset prices at any time reflect all the information available to the agents in a financial system.
However, recent studies have shown that investors’ behaviour often deviates from the rationality
implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The idea that investors’ psychology plays a fun-
damental role in determining price dynamics has led to a new field called behavioural finance,
where the behaviour of agents in a financial system departs from the assumption of rationality.
Behavioral aspects can explain a wide range of financial phenomena that cannot be inter-
preted within the EMH framework (e.g. momentum trading, trend extrapolation, noise trading,
overreaction, overshooting, contrarian strategies). Some useful references include DeBondt and
Thaler (1985), Hong and Stein (1999, 2003), and review papers such as Hirschleifer (2001), and
Barberis and Thaler (2003). Behavioural finance is currently expanding into different directions
(DeBondt et al., 2008).
The debate is enriched by the fact that financial systems are witnessing the emergence of very
complex structures. Complexity definitely plays a key role here: the crisis has unequivocally
shown that – within the complex financial environment – it is unrealistic to assume that, even
in presence of full information, agents will have the cognitive capabilities to process and make
optimal decisions from the available informative set.
There is, in fact, a strong consensus that financial systems show an increasing degree of
complexity on at least two levels. The first level relates to the rapid expansion in the number of
financial products traded. The intrinsic complexity embedded in the financial evaluation of such
2For further details, see Robert K. Merton’s 1995 historical account on the Thomas theorem where the author
explains why the statement became known as a theorem.
4products has remarkable consequences in terms of systemic risk (Caccioli et al. 2009; Brock &
Hommes, 2008). The second level pertains to the complex network structure of financial markets
(Haldane and May, 2011; Battiston et al. 2013).
On both levels, complexity in financial markets implicates that a huge amount of information
needs to be gathered, analyzed and understood before even attempting to make any decision, let
alone an optimal one. In this increasingly complex environment, hence, the view that investors
are fully rational implies that they must possess unrealistic cognitive skills.
The key aspect here is precisely linked to the limited cognitive capabilities of human beings.
Prompted by such limitations, Herbert Simon (1955) introduced the idea that agents have
“limited knowledge and ability”. This approach led to the introduction of the concept of bounded
rationality, which entails the viewpoint that agents would rather adopt a “satisficing” strategy as
opposed to a fully optimal decision-making strategy. Simon refers to environmental conditions
leading to this particular behaviour. More specifically, Bawden and Robinson (2008) refer to
information overload as a core characteristic yielding to boundedly rational behaviour. Agnew
and Szykman (2005) have explored this concept in the context of behavioural finance, stressing
that informative overload prevents investors from formulating and deciding upon the correct
strategy to pursue and might result in more simplistic investing strategies.
The complexity conundrum implies that some investors might look and imitate the behaviour
of those investors who are believed to be better informed, sometimes ignoring fundamentals or
private information. Devenow and Welch (1996) refer to such situation as rational herding
and, interestingly within the context we intend to model, stress the importance of informational
(cascade) learning. Crucial for our analysis, these works show that investors might consider
“pooling” other investors’ opinions for a number of reasons, including the fact that they are
unsure about the information they possess, for strategic purposes or even because they show a
particular aversion for large losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
Sobel (2000) wonders whether imitation can be attributed to a rational choice and emphasises
the separation between “individual” and “social” learning. In this light, agents are “informa-
tionally linked, so that the actions and payoffs of one agent provide information about the state
of the world” to other agents. Sobel also raises the issue of whether individual na¨ıveness of
agents in large groups translates into the system being “smart” in the aggregate.
This is the object of the study of a seminal paper by Galton (1907) about the so–called
“wisdom of the crowd” (Surowiecki, 2005) enigma. Galton found that the average guess, among
those expressed by a group of people upon the butchered weight of an ox, was actually an
extremely accurate way to gauge the actual weight.
Are then aggregate predictions always so accurate? If we observe the aggregate behaviour
in certain critical situations – and, in financial system, also in non-critical ones – one should
rather speak of “madness of crowds” (cit., Mackay, 1841).
Golub and Jackson (2010) tackled the problem of na¨ıve learning in connection with the
“wisdom of crowds” in a social network framework. In particular, they determine conditions
when beliefs converge to a true value and what obstacles might hamper the convergence process.
Lorenz et al. (2011) propose an empirical validation of this problem.
This work and, later, the contributions of Hegselmann and Krause (2005) and Lorenz (2005a,
2005b, 2006) provide with detailed analytical conditions for the convergence towards the consoli-
dation or the fragmentation of opinion patters. The opinion dynamics modeling framework used
5in these works is routed within a stream of literature where the key motivation is the search of a
common opinion, or consensus. Perhaps, the most well known formulation is the one proposed
by DeGroot (1974). However, several authors had previously tackled this problem (notably
French, 1956; Harary, 1959). Interestingly for our problem, the basic idea beneath DeGroot’s
approach is that agents “pool” the opinions of neighbours and revise their own opinion by a
simple arithmetic average of these opinions.
This modelling scheme constitutes the basis of our work and motivates Golub and Jackson’s
approach within a social network framework, as it implies a pairwise interaction among agents.
The interaction is represented by the confidence weights agents place onto one another.
Later contributions (namely the already mentioned Hegselmann and Krause, 2005; Lorenz,
2007) extend this approach, by introducing the idea that the confidence network depends on
the opinions and, in turn, opinions are updated according to the network. Nonlinearity arises
precisely in that opinions influence the confidence network and vice versa. This will be the basis
of the nonlinear model we propose. The scheme proposed Hegselmann and Krause (2005) is
based on an update rule according to which, at each time, every agent select a subset of agents
whose opinions are the closest, within a specified threshold.
For this reason, this opinion dynamics modelling approach is referred to as a bounded con-
fidence scheme. We can therefore state that bounded confidence is one of the many degrees of
freedom (Barberis and Thaler, 2003, p. 64) in behavioural finance that can be associated to
bounded rationality. The conceptual link between the change in confidencewith bounded ratio-
nality is then made explicit in this class of models.
The basic argument here is that the bounded rationality of agents in the marketplace natu-
rally leads to a certain level of interaction among agents. The mutual interaction between agents
is a key aspect within this context and will be the main subject of our study.
Several authors have investigated this problem under different perspectives and modelling ap-
proaches. Lux and Marchesi (1998) show that scaling power law properties and time-dependent
volatily may depend on this interaction. In view of this problem Cont and Bouchaud (2000)
model herd and imitative behaviour with a random interaction structure among clusters of
agents, finding a potential explanation for heavy tails in the distribution of returns.
Analogously to the bounded confidence model, agents’ interaction can be the result of a
specific selection. As such, a model featuring an adaptive financial system, is more suitable
at explaining these behavioural limitations (Hommes and Wagener, 2008). In particular, an
emergent stream of literature deals with models where heterogenous agents interact and deter-
mine asset price dynamics. Among the several contributions in this field, those of Brock and
Hommes (1998), Lux (1998), Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) and Chiarella et al. (2007) are
of particular interest for our work.
The introduction of heterogeneous agents finds its root in overcoming the typical limitations
embedded in models with representative agents: as a matter of fact, in the real world, agents
naturally have heterogeneous beliefs about asset dynamics. In this context, a logical separation
between two categories of agents arises: fundamentalists (i.e. agents who believe that prices will
eventually converge towards a fundamental value, simply given by the discounted sum of future
dividends) and chartists. Under the EMH, the latter category would be irrational as they would
simply lose money in the long run. However, there is evidence that these agents might be able
to obtain higher-than-average returns.
6Consistently with the approach we will follow, one of the basic tenets of this class of models
is that agents want to exploit temporary deviations from a fundamental price (based on rational
expectations) and this might lead agents to adopt short–period strategies that depart from
rationality (see Brock and Hommes, 1998 for a thorough discussion).
These Agent Based Models (ABMs) often feature an adaptive dynamics (adaptive beliefs)
based on the success of previous strategies (either in simple terms of price forecast or in terms
of accumulated profits) where the interaction in these models stems from the agents’ capability
of observing other agents’ strategies and, by switching strategy, imitating the most successful
ones. However, the number of agent types presented in these model is usually limited and the
interaction occurs via price realizations.
We propose to overcome these limitations by modelling agents’ interaction via a dynamic
network approach, associating the network process to the price dynamics. The pricing equation
is based on opinions (Section 2) formed upon a certain rule, therefore introducing the nonlinear
network opinion dynamics approach within this class of models.
In our model, agents interact along three intertwined dimensions: i) a network, based on the
level of confidence that agents place onto one another, ii) a more classical interaction via the
prices, and iii) comparing their opinions.
An important caveat should be made clear. In the model we propose, we are not strictly
interested in whether and how the system reaches a consensus of opinions, as opinions in our
model can vary significantly in time, although this represents surely an interesting case and
will be explored in the case of reversion towards a fundamental financial value. We are rather
interested in finding a way to characterize agents according to their role in the nonlinear opin-
ion/price/network process, according to their topological role within the network.
The model captures also situations when changes in the topology are coupled with significant
shifts in opinions. This is particularly important within the increasing adoption of high frequency
trading. This aspect will be further explored in the following motivating example, where we draw
a parallel with the aforementioned Thomas theorem.
A motivating example
On April 23, 2013, at 1:07 PM the US stock market crashed by about 1% in a couple of
minutes, recovering soon afterwards in about the same time. Fig. 1 shows a snapshot of the
DJ 30 industrial index one minute intraday time series during those minutes (see the sudden
and dramatic drop in the index visibile towards the end of the time series snapshot). What
happened during those few minutes?
At 1:07 p.m., Associated Press tweeted that the US president had been reported injured in
an explosion at the White House (see Fig. 2). The tweet was fake, probably due to a hacker
that had temporary access to AP’s account. The tweet was immediately retweeted a number of
times (about 4000 in less than a minute, and even more in the next minutes).
This two-minute storm, or “flash-crash” – which led to a ∼ 1% drop and a loss of $130 billion
in stock value – cannot be explained by only one tweet: indirect (network) effects have to be
taken into account, probably also due – as several observers have pointed out – to the increasing
adoption of high-frequency automated trading strategies.
7Figure 1: April 23 DJ 30 Industrial crash – 1 minute intraday.
Figure 2: AP tweet reporting explosions at the White House.
8We believe that, in addition to this, AP’s authority as an independent and reliable agency
(coupled with the “check mark” that certifies a verified Twitter account), led investors (inde-
pedently from their strategy) to immediately trust the consequences of such a tweet, without
verifying its truthfulness.
Whether or not the fake tweet was intentionally meant to destabilise the stock market is still
an open question. Doubtless, it shows that the financial system is intrinsically vulnerable to
opinion shifts, regardless of the truthfulness of the underlying fact. The vulnerability of financial
markets to such threats represents an open also for regulators as it leaves observers “speculating
once more about their vulnerability to breaking news in the age of social media”.3
We have now come full circle. Referring, once more, to the Thomas theorem, the consequences
were real, although the actual “situation” was not.4
2 Opinions and prices: a network model
Consider a set V of i = 1, . . . , n agents, one risky asset and one risk – free asset (with interest
rate r). The price dynamics is denoted by (p(t))t∈N. Let zi(t) be the quantity (number of
shares) of the risky asset purchased by agent i at time t. Finally, let (y(t))t∈N be the dividend
at t (which will be assumed to be i.i.d. throughout this chapter). The wealth dynamical process
for each agent can be described by the following equation (expressed in vector form):
w(t+ 1) = (1 + r)w(t) + (p(t+ 1) + y(t+ 1)− (1 + r)p(t)) z(t) (1)
In order to capture the opinion dynamics, we will denote the opinion of agent i about the
price and the dividend innovation with the following expected value:
xi(t) = Ei(p(t)) + Ei(y(t)) = Ei(p(t) + y(t))
The opinion at time t is conditioned to the information set available at time t− 1. Opinions
are heterogenous for what regards the first moment of the distribution. The assumption can be
extended to higher moments of the distribution but this case will not be explored here. The
opinion about the variance of wealth is constant and equal for all agents, in line with Hommes
and Wagener (2005, review paper) and Chiarella et al.. (2007). The opinion (or, in the originl
context, belief ) that agent i has about her wealth can be then described as follows:
Ei(wi(t+ 1)) = (1 + r)wi(t) + xi(t+ 1)zi(t)− (1 + r)p(t)zi(t)
Vi(wi(t+ 1)) = σ
2 ∀i ∈ V,∀t ∈ N
Agents optimize their wealth in mean/variance, with the following utility function:
3AP Twitter hack causes panic on Wall Street and sends Dow plunging, The Guardian, April
23, 2013. Online version available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/apr/23/
ap-tweet-hack-wall-street-freefall
4Many scholars have pointed out that self – fulfilling prophecies, i.e. statements or predictions that cause
themselves to be true, represent a conundrum in the theory of social systems. R. Merton’s Social Theory and
Social Structure (1968) provides an extensive philosophical and historical portrayal of this fascinating concept.
9ui(w(t)) = −e−aiW (t),
where ai is the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) coefficient. This approach is
consisent with the literature we refer to (Hommes & Wagener, Chiarella et al.). The wealth-
maximisation problem at t can be then expressed as follows:
max
zi(t)
{
Ei(w(t+ 1), t)− a2σ2
}
thus leading to
zi(t) =
1
aσ2
(xi(t+ 1)− (1 + r)p(t)) (2)
as the optimal demand of the risky asset for agent i at time t. Hence, the optimal demand
(number of shares) of agent i at time t proportional to the difference between the opinion on
the risky asset price and dividend att + 1 the capitalized price at t, and inversely proportional
to the absolute risk aversion coefficient a and, obviously, the variance.
We assume that there is a limited outside supply per agent, that will be denoted by zs
(with nzs obviously being the overal outside supply). We have a convenient way to obtain the
equilibrium price of the risky asset via the following equilibrium:
1
n
N∑
i=1
1
aσ2
(xi(t+ 1)− (1 + r)p(t)) = zs (3)
which finally leads to the following pricing equation:
(1 + r)p(t) =
1
n
N∑
i=1
xi(t+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
average opinion
− aσ2zs︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
(4)
As previously mentioned, we will assume that the dividend sequence (y(t))t=1,2... is i.i.d.,
with variance σ2 and will be the only source of randomness in the model. If σ = 0, then price
is deterministic and given only by the discounted average opinion.
2.1 Introducing the network interaction
We now describe the opinion dynamics x(t) and the price dynamics p(t) for the risky asset.
Hommes and Wagener (2005) and, in more detail, Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) assume
an interaction based on the success of the trading strategy basing it on a fitness function.
Our contribution in this work lies in adopting an explicit interaction strategy, where agents
learn from others according to specific rule. The interaction among agents, capture by a confi-
dence network, whose topology will be crucial in our model. Agents are modeled as vertices in
the network. The network is time-dependent and evolves according to specific update rules that
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capture different situations in the financial system. The update rule modifies the underlying
interaction network topology among agents.
Agents are boundedly rational and DeGroot’s approach is particularly suitable in our context
because, “incorporate indirect information in a boundedly rational way” (cit. Golub and Jackson
[33]).
Hence, we will assume a pairwise interaction with a dynamics of the kind described within
the consensus problem of DeGroot (1974). This issue was later tackled -for example- by Berger
(1981) and, in a more general opinion dynamics framework, recently developed by Hegselmann
and Krause (2005) and Lorenz (2007). The Methods Section of this paper provides with a
detailed and rigorous discussion of these models and the mathematical background that will be
needed in develop our model in rest of this Section. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly
outline the main aspects and conclusions.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the basic problem of DeGroot was to develop a model
to find a consensus (i.e. a shared opinion) within a set of agents V who revise their opinions
by averaging (or “’pooling’) other agents’ opinions. In particular, for each pair of agents (i, j),
agent i assings a weight aij ∈ [0, 1] to the opinion of agent j “to accommodate the information
and expertise, the opinions and judgements, of the rest of the group”.
In this original statement of the problem, it is assumed that the linear combination is convex
(i.e.
∑
j=1 aij = 1 and does not vary over time. As such, the model borrows some analytical
results from Markov chain theory in order to find conditions for the convergence to a common
opinion. A later, more general approach is the one of Hegselmann and Krause (2005), who
introduce the bounded confidence opinion dynamics scheme: the weighing structure is time-
dependent.
A key aspect in our model is the topological classification of agents into essential and inessen-
tial classes. Intuitively, the set of agents can be split into subsets of strongly connected com-
ponents (SCC). Agents within the same SCC communicate, in that it is always possible to find
a path from and to any pair of agents. In other words, within a SCC, agents have direct or
indirect positive confidence weight in any other agents within the same SCC. When no agent
belonging to a specific SCC puts a positive confidence weight on an agent belonging to another
SCC, then the first SCC corresponds to an essential class. Vice versa, when one or more agents
belonging to a specific SCC put a positive weight onto an agent belonging to another SCC, then
the class is said to be inessential. A rigourous formulation of this concept is provided in the
Methods Section.
The relationship between essential and inessential classes, as pointed out by Berger (1981),
will determine whether a common or fragmented opinion will be reached and how. Opinions
of agents in the essential classes are considered by other inessential agents, but not vice versa.
Predominant opinions and hence, prices, will then be determined by a linear combination of
the opinions of the essential agents. Loosely speaking, essential agents are the opinion leaders
whereas inessential agents are opinion followers.
Our setup, however, allows that essential and inessential classes of agents may vary over
time, according to the update rule. In other words, an agent can change her topological role in
time. Since we are studying the model by means of simulations, we then need an algorithm to
classify essential and inessential agents and find the class they belong to at each t.
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The opinion revision process is captured by the following equation:
x(t) = A(t) x(t− 1) (5)
which, coupled with Equation 4 will give the price at each t.
The process that we will assume in this model involves a change in the confidence network at
each t, as a convex linear combination of the previous confidence matrix and an update matrix
C(t):
aij(t) = αi cij(t) + (1− αi) aij(t− 1) (6)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is an update propensity parameter. This parameter is key in our model
because, as it will be shown in the simulations, the behaviour of the system depends non-
trivially on it. The element cij(t) of C(t) represents the update (revision) of the confidence
weight that i has towards j, and is determined according to the following rule:
cij(t) :=
{
1
#I(i,x(t−1),p(t−1)) if j ∈ I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1))
0 otherwise
It is immediate to prove that, according to this rule, C(t) is row stochastic ∀t and, therefore,
also A(t) is also row – stochastic ∀t.
The model is non - linear because of the interaction among the opinions, prices and the
confidence network. In the context of consensus/opinion dynamics, Hegselmann and Krause
(2005) also refer to this kind of model as non–linear and point out that “the most difficult type
of model occurs if the weights depend on opinions itself because then the model turns from a
linear one to a non–linear one”.
Differently from the standard approach, we do not focus on specific trader types. Rather,
agents are classified according to the role they play in the topological structure, hence allowing
to capture their beahviour along a continuum of possible strategies, coupled with the evolving
topology of interactions. The choice of the set I(i,x(t − 1), p(t − 1)) for each agent i will lead
to different types of models and will be now detailed.
2.1.1 Bounded confidence model
In the first case, we will adopt a similar approach to the one in Hegselmann and Krause (2005)
and reported in Equation 13 in the Methods section. The authors refer to it as bounded confidence
in that a threshold exists when determining to whom an agent puts a confidence weight. We
also label this model as bounded confidence (BC). The adaptive update matrix C(t) is:
I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1)) = {j s.t. |xi(t− 1)− xj(t− 1)| ≤ i} (7)
In this scenario, there is no need to look at fundamentals in order to understand the price
dynamics. Prices will be driven only by the opinions and the opinions will be pooled according
the bounded confidence non – linear model. The non – linearity in the model will lead to opinion
polarization and fragmentation, thus the average in Eq. 4 can increase or decrease dramatically
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according to such level of polarisation. It is important to notice that {i} is included in the set
I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1)) by construction.
2.1.2 Price adaptive strategy
The idea in this setting is that those agents whose opinions are the closest to the actual price
at time t (price adaptive, PA) will be followed, in the next time step, by other agents. In
an “adaptive” perspective, these agents are thus those capable of understanding the nontrivial
impact of both opinions on price and the impact of dividend innovations.
In this adaptive setting, agents revise the confidence matrix as in Equation 6, but the set
I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1)) is now given by:
I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1)) = {i} ∪
{
j s.t.
∣∣∣∣p(t− 1)− xi(t− 1)p(t− 1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ i} (8)
In other words, in this case, cij(t) represents an adaptive strategy where agents tend to
follow more agents that had close opinions to the actual realized price. If i is a nonzero
constant ∀i ∈ V , then C(t) is a rank one matrix at each t. Since the price is driven both by the
opinion dynamics and an exogenous divided innovation, this model reflects a situation where
agents want to follow other agents that have proven to be successful in the past.
The reason why we insert the set {i} in the set I in the set 8 is because we want to have
a non-empty set and also allow the matrix A(t) to have a positive diagonal (also in the case
α = 1).
2.1.3 Fundamental benchmark
The reversion of asset prices towards a fundamental value is a long–debated issue in the financial
literature.5 When all agents have identical long – term expectations (opinions) on the price, i.e.
xi(t) = c,∀i ∈ V , we can assume x(t) to be the analogous of a consensus limit vector where all
agents belong to the same essential class. The pricing equation 4 can be then rewritten as:
(1 + r)p(t) = c− aσ2zs
We can also define a fundamental price given by the discounted sum of all expected future
dividends:
p∗(t) =
∞∑
k=1
E(yt+k, t)− aσ2z2
(1 + r)k
(9)
which can be set in an analogous way of a perpetuity with interest r. An interesting aspect
is that, at a specific time t, should the confidence matrices be fixed, one can assume that there
are g different asymptotic opinions, each of which can be associated to an essential class of the
5References include Lo and Mackinlay (1988), who develop a specification test and claim that “prices do not
follow random walks”; Fama and French (1988); and Poterba and Summers (1988) who focus explicity on mean
reversion in asset pricess, tackled by Stefani et al. (2010) in commodity trading.
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kind described in the Methods section. When (y(t))t=1,2,..., then E[yt] = y¯ and the fundamental
price is constant over t:
p∗ =
∞∑
k=1
y¯ − aσ2zs
(1 + r)k
=
y¯ − aσ2zs
r
We will show, by simulations, that in this model based on fundamentals (FB), opinion shifts
in the essential classes will lead to significant changes in prices.
In this case, we assume the set I to be determined as follows:
I(i,x(t− 1), p(t− 1)) = {i} ∪
{
j s.t.
∣∣∣∣p∗ − xi(t− 1)p∗
∣∣∣∣ ≤ i}
This implies that all agents will see deviations from the fundamental as temporary and will
tend to trust agents whose opinion does not deviate significantly from the fundamental. In
behavioral terms, agents want to “find a confirmation” from other agents that the fundamental
is the correct long-term benchmark. However, small and temporary deviations are perceived as
reasonable and agents will still try to maximize their short - term wealth (myopic maximisation)
by exploiting them.
There is one general case when the fundamental price is achieved in “aggregate” at time t, i.e.
when the average opinion on the price is equal to the fundamental ( 1n
∑n
i=1 xi(t) = p
∗(t)). As a
particular case, obviously, when at t, all the agents’ opinions are all equal to the fundamental
at time t.
The first, more general, case could occur in a number of situations. For example, even in
presence of high variability in the opinions, the system can reach the fundamental price anyway,
if the average opinion coincides with it.
2.2 Combinations of strategies
The flexibility of the model we propose allows to have different strategies (BC, PA, FB) for each
agent; different trader types (e.g. fundamentalists, chartists, contrarians, etc.) can be modeled
within this framework. Among the many possible combinations, an interesting analysis would
be to assume different strategies for essential and inessential agents assuming, for instance, two
interesting scenarios that will be the subject of future research and will not be explored here.
In the first scenario, essential (opinion drivers) agents’ behaviour would be encapsulated
within a Bounded Confidence model with a very low update propensity, whereas inessential
agents (opinion followers) would be following a Price Adaptive strategy with a very high update
propensity. This would lead to a situation where a few leaders drive the opinion dynamics and
many followers adjust very quickly to those agents whose opinion was the most accurate at each
time step.
The second scenario is analogous to the first, with a significant difference. The essential
agents are split into two categories: opinion leaders who follow a fundamentalist strategy with a
very low update propensity and other “impulsive” essential agents who follow a price adaptive
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strategy. In this case, the essential agents in the second category would enhance little fluctuations
when price temporarily depart from the fundamentals.
Although not explicitly explored here, the model potentially allows to capture agents who
explicitly want to be followed (thus determining the market), acting as opinion leaders. This
obviously introduces the problem of the controllability of the confidence network. The framework
might then be useful also for regulators.
3 Simulation results and discussion
In this section, we show and discuss simulation results on the dynamics described by Equations
4, 6 according to the three models (BC, Equation 7; PA 8 and FB, 9). We start with the
analysis of the price dynamics and later provide some descriptive statistics on the distribution
of returns. Given the number of parameters in the model, we will make the following simplifying
assumptions:
1. The variance on the dividend innovations is constant ∀t and ∀i (i.e. on the innovation
opinions) and equal to σ;
2. Eit(tt+1) = y¯, ∀i, t;
3. in any case, i = , ∀i.
The first part of the simulation analysis (Figures 3, 5 and 4) reports a representation of the
price p(t) in time, obtained from the pricing equation 4, by averaging out 1000 realizations of
the process in Equation 6 from the same starting opinion profile x(0), that it is distributed as
a log – normal with mean 3. The number of agents is set to n = 100.
In particular, figures 3, 5, 4 show simulations for the price dynamics for the models BC,
FB and PA respectively. Some descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 2a – 2f for the price
returns r(t) = p(t)/p(t−1)−1. These statistics and the price dynamics reflect some well–known
stylized facts in financial markets (e.g., clustered volatility, fat tails, asymmetric returns). In
particular, although the return distributions are slightly asymmetric, we used the excess kurtosis
as a way to compare tail distribution with those of a normal distribution one can see that fat
tails arise in the BC non – linear model (where polarisation occurs) when the update propensity
parameter α is very high. This means that the quicker the fragmentation, the quicker non –
linear phenomena arise and fat tails occur. The PA model, on the contrary, produces no fat –
tails, as the result of a strong reversion towards the fundamental.
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Figure 3: BC model for different values of α and σ.
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Figure 4: PA model for different values of α and σ.
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Figure 5: FB model for different values of α and σ. Fundamental value is the horizontal red
line.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the price returns p(t) over 1000 simulations for the three
models and different values of the update propensity parameter α and σ.
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 0.20 -0.03 0.02
α = 0.5 -0.21 -0.16 0.25
α = 0.9 0.12 0.05 -0.02
(a) BC model – skewness
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 -0.38 -0.45 -0.18
α = 0.5 -0.00 0.42 0.00
α = 0.9 0.29 -0.08 0.59
(b) BC – (excess) kurtosis
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 0.14 -0.02 -0.09
α = 0.5 0.09 -0.16 -0.13
α = 0.9 0.08 0.11 0.12
(c) PA model - skewness
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 0.10 -0.34 -0.14
α = 0.5 0.66 -0.22 -0.01
α = 0.9 -0.14 -0.12 -0.26
(d) PA model – (excess) kurtosis
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 0.05 -0.18 0.12
α = 0.5 -0.02 0.19 -0.17
α = 0.9 0.18 -0.00 0.08
(e) FB model - skewness
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1
α = 0.1 -0.09 0.23 -0.04
α = 0.5 -0.21 0.40 0.20
α = 0.9 -0.22 0.59 -0.39
(f) FB model - (excess) kurtosis
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3.1 Opinion shifts
This specific simulation setup aims at explaining sudden drops in price followed by quick recov-
eries in presence of herding behaviour. In particular, we will try to assess whether the drop in
the DJ30 following the fake tweet by AP can be explained in terms of network effects. To do
so, we assume a “sudden” exogenous change at t = 50 for either some essential classes or the
union set of all inessential classes. The basic idea is to assess whether changes in the opinion
profiles of essential classes might have a different impact with respect to change in the opinion
profiles of inessential classes, regardless of convergence. In fact, the conditions outlined in the
Methods Section show that essential classes play a role in determining the value towards which
opinions converge, but very little can be said, from an analytical perspective, about short–term
behaviour. In particular, we will see that changes in inessential classes do have an impact on
slowing the recovery.
Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration of the dynamics we assume in this simulation setup.
The Figure reports a topology with one essential class (the node on the left hand side), and three
inessential classes (in the center and on the right hand side). An opinion shift occurs at a specific
time t in an essential class composed of only one agent, producing a limited impact on the price.
At t+1, one agents for each inessential class starts witnessing the shift and updates her opinion,
the impact on the price therefore starts to increase, now involving four agents. At t+2, agents in
two inessential classes update their opinions. The shift has now had an impact on eight agents,
with a more significant impact on the price. n price but it will persist less. Should a revision of
the previous shift occur in the essential agent, this would take two time steps to lead the price
to a full recovery.
Figure 7 shows that, in the BC model, when drops occur in the essential classes, they tend to
persist for low values of σ: in fact, the bounded nature of the model will provide a polarisation
versus a low market scenario rather than a recovery. This is not the case when the drop occurs
in the inessential classes (Fig. 8), where we observe a milder impact. Figures 9 and 10 shows
analogous findings for the PA model. The most interesting case is the FB model, where it is
important to understand whether a return to the fundamental benchmark will occur and the
time to recovery.
Figure 11 and 12 outline an important fact: drops happen and persist when opinion shifts
occur in both essential and inessential classes, then recovering quite rapidly. However, the drops
are much more pronounced in the essential class case and for lower values of σ, thus showing
that a higher variability in dividend innovations might lead to a more stable price dynamics
w.r.t. sudden opinion shifts. The role of the update propensity parameter α is important for
higher values of σ in that lower propensity implies a lower degree of abandoment of previously
formed opinions on the deviations from the fundamental, hence making recovery faster.
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Opinion shift. Opin-
ion shift (agent i at t,
essential class).
t+ 1
Direct effects. Fol-
lowers (from inessen-
tial classes) of i revise
their opinion at t+ 1.
t+ 2
Indirect effects.
Followers of follow-
ers of i revise their
opinion at t+ 2
Figure 6: Illustration of the opinion shift in an essential class and its reverberations on the
inessential classes. Agent i represents an essential class (the only one present in the graph) on
her own.
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Figure 7: BC, opinion shift (drop) in essential classes
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Figure 8: BC, opinion shift (drop) drop in inessential classes
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Figure 9: PA, opinion shift (drop) in essential classes
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Figure 10: PA, opinion shift (drop) in inessential classes
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Figure 11: FB, opinion shift (drop) in essential classes. The fundamental value is in red.
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Figure 12: FB, opinion shift (drop) in inessential classes. The fundamental value is in red.
In order to understand the DJ30 drop occurred in the early afternoon of April 23, 2013
described in the Introduction of this work (and reported again in Fig. 13a) we focused on a
one-run simulation reported in Fig. 13b and, zoomed-in, in 13c. Here, we simulated a situation
where drops in opinion occurred in only two essential classes for a total number of 10 agents
shifting opinion. The drop is dramatic and shows the importance of the topological classification
of agents.
4 Empirical validation and model calibration
The empirical validation of such a model is not an easy task. Although some stylized facts
like clustered volatility, drops in prices that lead to fat tails in the returns distribution can be
explained by simulations, the calibration of the parameters of the model we have is an open
problem that we leave for future research. For example, as we have seen, the correct estimation
of the update propensity parameter α is crucial.
Time series for prices are easily available. However, determining and calibrating the interac-
tion network and the update propensity parameter seems to be the hardest part of the problem.
We propose to use the wide availability of Big Data (i.e. Twitter microblogging) to have a
proxy for such interactions. Applying Twitter data (and, in general, social network big data) in
the context of financial markets is still a research endeavour (see Bollen, 2010). However, the
recent use of Twitter data in giving signals about markets by the famous data service provider
Bloomberg, clearly shows a growing interest in this approach. We can then give an outline of
the future research that will need to be done to accomplish this task:
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Figure 13: Temporary large deviations from a fundamental can be explained by
opinion shifts. Opinion shift (drop) in 2 essential classes leads to drop in price (blue line) and
return to fundamental after confidence weights have shifted due to the update to the fundamental
(red dotted line). The figure on the right zooms in the time periods where the opinion shift
takes place. This figure provides a possible interpretation of the DJ drop on April 13, 2013 after
the fake tweet apperared.
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• Twitter and, more generally, social network provide with a huge amount of data, in the
order of terabytes per minute. As such, algorithms must be fast and efficient, especially
in the classification of agents.
• At each t, agents needs to be classified according to the their topological importance (this
includes, but it is not limited to, the separation into essential and inessential classes).
• Social network data naturally embed a multiple network structure, i.e. a structure where
several interactions might occur. A possible way to cope with this problem is to use a
tensor sequence as a means to treat multiple networks (see Kolda, 2005) (A(t))t∈N
aijk(t) =
{
∈ (0, 1] if j retweets i’s tweet about stock $k at t
0 otherwise
5 Conclusions and future research
In this work, we have proposed an analytical framework to model the role of opinion dynamics
in a financial system. We have stressed the intertwined relationship among opinions, the actual
price dynamics and the interaction network among agents. Different cases have been explored
and we showed, by simulations, that some stylized facts can be reproduced and explained in this
way. Moreover, we proposed an empirical validation scheme for the model.
This work stems from the need to interpret the role of opinion dynamics in an increasingly
interconnected world, where network effects play an important role in determining the evolution
of social systems.
Particular emphasis has been given to the topology of the interaction network and to the
classification of agents according to their role in the dynamical process of opinion formation.
We have explored the different models proposed in the literature and we have built on a well
– known nonlinear model where opinion fragmentation might occur. In this case, we noticed
that such dynamics reflects on the price formation process in a feedback loop in the sense that
agents will tend to shape their opinion patterns according to the topology and vice – versa, the
topology is determined by the opinion patterns.
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Future research directions
The approach proposed in this work provides a framework that can be extended by future
research on these topics.
For what concerns the network interaction topology, a detailed analysis on the properties
of network dynamics when the network has a specific topology should be done. We refer to,
e.g. random, small – world, scale – free or core – periphery (see Newman, 2010 for details on
such network topologies) topology structures. Finding analytical results for specific topologies
would be useful for empirical comparison and analysis of the dynamical system. In particular,
we think of a scheme where the topology is imposed to the essential classes: this would drive
different polarisation/fragmentation patterns that would then need to be compared with the
actual empirical data.
Moreover, we would like to extend the model on price formation to more than one risky
asset (see Chiarella et al. 2007 for an account on this problem) by assuming different confidence
networks for each asset. In other words, we want to investigate a multidimensional opinion
dynamics problem. We propose a dynamic multiple network approach to this problem, by using
a tensor representation (see Kolda and Bader 2009), as follows (see Fig. 14 for a graphical
representation):
A(t) ∈ Rn×n×m = [aijs(t)]
Figure 14: Tensor multiple network approach for opinion dynamics.
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A Materials and methods
A.1 Graphs and networks
We will outline the key concepts in graph and network theory used in the paper6. A graph
G = (V,E) is a pair of sets (V,E), where V is the set of n vertices and E is the set of m pairs
of vertices of V . The pair (i, j) belonging to E is called an edge of G and i and j are called
adjacent. A directed graph (digraph) is a graph in which each edge is an ordered pair (i, j)
of vertices. G is simple if there one edge between two adjacent vertices. A weight wij can be
associated to each edge (i, j) and, in this case, we will have a weighted or valued graph. A path
is a sequence of distinct adjacent vertices and a i − j path is a path from i to j. For a pair of
vertices (i, j), i and j communicate if it holds i− j and j− i. In case wii > 0 ∀i, it always holds
i − i, and we call i self communicating. A vertex i is essential if, ∀j ∈ V , with i − j, it holds
j − i and we denote such property with i ∼ j. A vertex i is inessential if it is not essential.
V can be partitioned into self–communicating equivalence classes of vertices. In fact it easy
to see that if i is self communicating and (i, j) communicate, then i ∼ i, i ∼ j ⇒ j ∼ i and,
finally, if i ∼ j and j ∼ k ⇒ i ∼ k, i.e. a path from i to k and vice versa can always be found
passing through j. Hence, ∼ is an equivalence relation. A self-communicating inessential vertex
constitutes an equivalence class on its own. In an essential class, all vertices communicate to
each other and do not communicate with other vertices belonging to other classes. On the other
hand, inessential vertices are linked to either essential and inessential vertices.7 A particular
case arises when all vertices belong to one essential class, i.e. ∀(i, j) i ∼ j. In this case, the
graph is called strongly connected.
A nonnegative n – square matrix W representing the adjacency relationships (in general,
weighted and directed), between vertices of G is said to be the adjacency matrix of G. A
nonnegative adjacency matrix W is said to be diagonal dominant if wii ≥
∑
j 6=iwij ∀i. W
is said to be irreducible if for some permutation matrix P, the (permuted) matrix PWPT
is not block upper triangular. A matrix that is not irreducible is said to be reducible. The
adjacency matrix of a strongly connected graph is irreducible. If there exist a t ∈ N such that
Wt is (strictly) positive, then W is said to be primitive. An n–vector x is said to be a right
eigenvector of W, with associated eigenvalue λ if Wx = λx. For any n× n matrix, there exist
n eigenvalues λ1, λ1, . . . , λn.
A nonnegative n–square matrix W ∈ Rn×n is row – stochastic if the elements in each row
sum up to 1, i.e.
∑n
j=1wij = 1 ∀i or, in matrix notation, Wu = u, where u is the n–th unit
vector. It is easy to show that a row stochastic matrix has dominant eigenvalue λ1 = 1 with u
its associated eigenvector.
Any square matrix W can be brought in its Gantmacher form:
6The reader may refer to Harary (1969) and Newman (2010) for more details. Two relevant references for
matrix theory are Gantmacher (1959) and Horn & Johnson (1990).
7This terminology is the one used in Lorenz [57]. In Markov chain theory, essential classes would be associated
to a recurrent class of communicating states and inessential vertices would be associated to transient states.
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WG = PWP
> =

W1,1 0
. . .
0 Wg,g
Wg+1,1 . . . Wg+1,g Wg+1,g+1
...
...
...
. . .
Wp,1 . . . Wp,g Wp,g+1 . . . Wp,p

where P is a suitable permutation matrix. The diagonal blocks W1,1, . . . ,Wp,p are square
and irreducible (Gantmacher 1959, Lorenz 2007). For the non diagonal Gantmacher blocks Wkl
with k = g+ 1, . . . , p and l = 1, . . . , k− 1. Then, it holds that for every k = g+ 1, . . . , p at least
one block of Wk,1, . . . ,Wk,k−1 contains at least one positive entry. It turns that Wkk, with
k = 1, . . . , g are the sub matrices associated to essential classes. Two non – negative matrices
A and B are said to be of the same type, A ∼ B if they share the same non negative pattern,
i.e. aij > 0⇔ bij > 0.
An important results of graph theory (see Harary, 1969) is that a non-connected graph G
can be uniquely partitioned into separate strongly connected components (SCC). When each
one of these strongly connected component is contracted to a single vertex, the resulting graph
is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the so called condensation of G. A DAG is a digraph with
no directed cycles, i.e. there exists no path connecting a node i to itself.
Given a graph G = (V,E), its condensation digraph C(C) = (VC , EC) is a graph where the
set of nodes VC is represented by the strongly connected components of G. Accordingly, the
condensation digraph of G, denoted C(G), is defined as follows: the nodes of C(G) are the SCCs
of G, and there exists a directed edge in C(G) from node H1 to node H2 if and only if there
exists a directed edge in G from a node of H1 to a node of H2.
A.1.1 Determining the Gantmacher form
We hereby propose a simple8 in order to solve the problem. The algorithm outline is as follows:
1. find the Strongly Connected Components of G, e.g. via Tarjan’s algorithm, of Depth First
Search based algorithms (O(|V |+ |E|)), see Knuth (1997);
2. find the condensation digraph C(G) of G;
3. for each node k of C(G) check links for nodes;
4. if node k has only in–coming links (i.e. sinks), then it is associated to an essential class;
5. if node k has only out – going links, then is is associated to an innessential class.
6. order nodes in C(G) in order to find permutation matrix for A.
8This algorithm is inspired by Fig. 2 in Mirtabadei & Bullo (2011). We thank Jan Lorenz (private communi-
cation) for providing useful hints.
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Table 2: Agents classification (via SCCs)
Lorenz (2006c) Mirt. Bullo (2011) SCCs condensation SCC Subgraph
essential closed minded sink complete
moderate minded not a sink non – complete
inessential open minded not a sink either
The algorithm proves to be quite fast for the applications in Section 4. However, better
solutions that do not imply the evaluation of a node of G multiple times could be found (via a
Depth-First Search approach.).
On the basis of such classification, a further refinement of Lorenz’s classification has been
proposed by Mirtabadei and Bullo (2011). See Table 2 for a comparison of the two classifications.
We now deal with the mathematical background related to the opinion dynamics scheme.
Several concepts are key in this class of models. We refer, in particular, to how accurate are
agents’ opinions about reality and how opinion pooling plays a role in this context9. However,
for sake of brevity, will shall not explore these concepts in detail.
Consider a set of interacting agents and a certain dynamical process leading to the formation
of an opinion space, represented by a scalar value. Some interesting questions naturally arise.
Will all agents reach the same opinion? Will there be a consolidation of different opinions
into fewer ones? We will refer to the first case as consensus of opinions and to the latter as
fragmentation of opinions (see, for example, Hegselmann & Krause, 2005).
DeGroot (1974) proposed one of the first mathematical formulations for the dynamics of
opinions, by introducing a weighted averaging scheme that will remain the baseline model in
later works. The convex weighted average scheme clearly stems from the mathematical properties
related to the product of stochastic matrices and, hence, Markov chains.10
In this light, another interesting work is the one of Berger (1981), in which sufficient condi-
tions for consensus are discussed in more details and an implicit relationships, later analyzed in
the literature on economic networks (Jackson, 2008), between consensus and eigenvector cen-
trality is provided. Berger’s paper shows also how a common opinion might be achieved only
within sub–groups of agents, hence implying a certain degree of opinion fragmentation within
the opinion structure(i.e. dissent as opposed to consensus). Other interesting approaches link-
ing network centrality and opinion dynamics are those of Friedkin (1986, 1991) and Friedkin &
Johnsen (1990).
The literature so far reviewed is based on models of interaction that are linear in their
nature. In the models proposed by DeGroot and Friedkin’s, for example, the focus is on a linear
dynamical system. As already mentioned, they make use of very well known properties of linear
9The so-called “Wisdom of the Crowd” idea, tracing back to Galton (1907).
10DeGroot clearly refers to an opinion as a subjective probability distribution, which each agent assigns to a
certain parameter. Such a priori opinions are then “pooled”, to obtain an a posteriori set of opinions, thus
implying a Bayesian framework. Previous formulations of this problem include the ones by J. French (1956),
Harary (1959) and later contributions include the ones (among others) by Chatterjee and Seneta (1977) and
Cohen et al. (1986). These works focus on reaching a common opinion, a consensus.
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systems and, in particular, of homogeneous Markov chain. Berger’s work implicitly introduces
a graph – theoretical argument based on connectivity, and Friedkin’s approach is entirely graph
– based.
A limitation lies in that such models do not capture the evolution in time of the interaction
network. Concerning this problem, interesting analytical results for time–dependent networks
are found in Moreau (2005) in the context of synchronization analysis and by Fazeli & Jadbabaie
(2012), who introduce a martingale network process associated to a Polya Urn process.
So far, opinions and network topology are separated. However, in our model of price forma-
tion, there is a strong interaction between opinions and the confidence network. In other words:
the interaction topology might be influenced by the opinions themselves.
An interesting way to cope with both these problems is the approach proposed by Krause in
a series of works (1997, 2000 and, with Hegselmann, in 2005). In this model, the non–linearity
arises because the topology of the confidence network changes in time according to the opinion
structure and, viceversa, the new opinion structure is derived by the network interaction. This
feedback relationship does not allow to easily derive analytical results. A combination of matrix
and graph – theoretical arguments can be used in order to partially overcome this problem, but
most of the interpretation must rely on computer simulations. In fact, although it is possible to
derive some sufficient conditions for the convergence of a system, it is still an open challenge to
fully characterise in an analytical way the dynamical behaviour of such a system.
Hegselmann & Krause (2005) propose a bounded confidence non – linear approach: agents
put a positive confidence weight to another agent if the absolute value of the difference of the
opinions does not exceed a certain threshold. According to such a threshold, this non – linear
model can capture effects of opinion fragmentation or polarization as well as convergence to a
consensus.
We define a stable opinion pattern in the dynamical system as that situation where agents
stabilize their opinion and no further change occurs. Once such a stable pattern is achieved, we
can, in fact, have the two following situations:
1. consensus, i.e. all agents have the same opinion;
2. dissent, i.e. agents will have different opinions that do not change over time. In particular,
we can divide dissent into polarization (i.e. agents can have only two opinions) and
fragmentation (when the number of possible opinions is higher than two).
Sufficient conditions for convergence in these models are found in the above mentioned works. In
addition to this, we recall the work of Lorenz (2005, 2006, 2007). We will observe, in particular,
that the setup suggested by Lorenz provides with useful insights on the topological classification
of agents. Further insights and some more technical results on the stabilisation patterns in the
classification of agents can be found in Mirtabadei and Bullo (2011).
A.2 Opinion dynamics: the mathematical background
A.2.1 The homogeneous opinion dynamics process
Consider a set V of n agents, and an opinion vector x(t) ∈ Rn at time t ∈ [0, . . . ,+∞). The
element xi(t) represents the opinion of agent i at time t. The n agents can be seen as vertices
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on a network, discussing a particular issue or trying to obtain better guesses about the value of
a variable at each time step, such as the price of a financial asset.
The general homogeneous consensus dynamic model can be written as (DeGroot, 1974):
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) (10)
Where A is a row – stochastic matrix, i.e.
∑
j aij = 1, ∀i. We will refer to this matrix as
the confidence matrix. The process is said to be homogeneus as the confidence matrix does not
change in time (time–invariant process). At time t+ 1, we have:
x(t+ 1) = At+1x(0) (11)
The model in Equation 11 reaches a consensus if ∀x(0) ∈ Rn, ∃c s.t. limt→∞ x(t) =
A∞x(0) = c, where c is a real – valued vector with all elements equal. The following two–
part theorem gives conditions in this case:11
Theorem 1 (Conditions for convergence to consensus). A consensus for system 11 is achieved:
• if ∀(i, j) ∈ E, ∃k ∈ V such that aik > 0 and ajk > 0 [see DeGroot (1974) for the proof];
• if and only if ∃ t0 ∈ T s.t. the matrix At0 contains at least one strictly positive column
[see Berger (1981) for the proof].
Theorem 2 (Conditions for convergence). Let A be in its Gantmacher form with diagonal
Gantmacher blocks Ak, k = 1, . . . , s and g = 0, . . . s, then
• limt→∞ x(t) exists ∀x(0) ∈ Rn if and only if the Gantmacher blocks are all primitive;
• the system reaches a consensus if and only if g = 1 (i.e. there exists only one essential
class and no inessential classes).
This first general theorem states that a sufficient condition for consensus is found when any
two agents have a positive weight on a same third agent. This conditions is related to the
primitivity of the matrix. The value c of the consensus depends, clearly, on the initial opinion
profile x(0).
The second theorem employs the Gantmacher form. If each of the sub – groups of essential
agents has a primitive structure, then a stable opinion configuration is achieved where only
the opinions of the essential agents matter in determining the asymptotic opinion vector. More
over, we have a necessary and sufficient condition for consensus when the sub – group of essential
agents is only one (g = 1, i.e. only one essential class).
We define a consensus matrix A˜ the rank – one strictly positive row – stochastic matrix
whose rows are all equal. It is immediate to see that A˜y always gives a consensus.
11For sake of brevity, we do not report the proofs of these theorem. We refer the reader to the already cited
works of Gantmacher (1959), DeGroot (1974), Berger (1981) and Hegselmann and Krause (2005).
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A.2.2 Inhomogeneous opinion dynamics process
A more general approach is obtained when A is time dependent:
x(t) = A(t) · · ·A(0)x(0) (12)
We refer to the process described by Eq. 12 as either inhomogenous (using the Markov
chains expression) or time – variant (as opposed to the time – invariant process described in
Eq. 11). Quite clearly, the “inhomogenous” or “time – variant” part of the model stems from
changes in the agents’ interaction topology and not directly from the opinion patterns in time.
However, we will see that, in the case when the weight (and hence the interaction topology)
depends on the opinions themselves, the feedback relationships between the opinions and the
network topology will show non – trivial behaviours.
The definitions we previously gave in the homogeneous case naturally extend to the inho-
mogeneous case. The sequence of n× n non – negative matrices A(t) in our model is said to be
a sequence of confidence matrices if and only if the matrices:
1. are row – stochastic, i.e.
∑
j aij(t) = 1, ∀t;
2. have strictly positive diagonal values, i.e. aii(t) > 0, ∀i ∈ V and ∀t;
The objective of our analysis will be thus the sequence of matrices (A0, . . .At) and, in
particular, their right – product A(t) . . .A(0) and its asymptotic behaviour for t→∞.12
The process described by Equation 12 is clearly more difficult to treat than the homogeneous
case and analytical results are harder to obtain. As usual, we are interested in determining
sufficient and necessary conditions for the convergence of the system. The structure of the
sequence of matrices A(t) will determine the asymptotic behaviour of the system. We will
observe that, analogously to what happens in the homogenous case, consensus or, more generally,
convergence to consensus in the sub – groups will be obtained as long as the weights keep being
positive to a certain degree and/or sufficient time passes by.
Several interesting results have been proposed in the literature. Among these, we recall
Moreau (2005), who describes a model of dynamic network interaction based on synchronization
theory, providing results based on both graph theory and system theory; Fazeli and Ali Jadbabaie
(2010), who use a Polya urn argument to show certain asymptotic properties and Fazeli &
Jadbabaie (2012), who propose some analytical results on convergence where the underlying
network process is a martingale. Alternative averaging schemes are not investigated in this
work.13
12As opposed to the Markov chain process, in which case, we are interested in the left product of the elements
of the sequence: A(0) . . .A(t).
13For a discussion on alternative averaging schemes see Krause (2000 and 2008). For a detailed explanation on
the speed of convergence of the system, refer to Isaacson & Madsen (1976), Gross & Rothblum (993); Rothblum
& Tan (1995). See Dobrushin, (1956) for an analysis of the ergodicity coefficient, later tackled by Ipsen & Selee
(2011) in an analysis that also explores concepts in network centrality.
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A.2.3 Convergence in the inhomogenous case
The intution behind the convergence in the inhomogeneous case is that a time – variant model
will converge provided that, as previously noted, both the weights keep beeing sufficiently posi-
tive and/or that enough time passes. The positive diagonal assumption will also play a signifi-
cant role in ensuring this. Clearly, should the weights go to zero too fast, convergence (let alone
consensus) might not be achieved.
Krause (2000) proposes an interesting theorem for convergence (not limited to arithmetic
means) and later, Hegselmann & Krause provide more general approach based on the arithmetic
average setting based on the accumulated weights. The intuition behind this approach is to keep
track of the weights of the chain of products.
Another way to see this problem is to exploit the positive diagonal. In fact, given a non –
negative matrix B with positive diagonal and a non – negative matrix C, then the product BC
has at least the same positive entries of C. Based on the above reported results, Lorenz (2005
and 2007) reports a convergence theorem based on the Gantmacher form.
Theorem 3. Given A(t), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , non – negative, row – stochastic with strictly positive
diagonal, and min+ A(t+ 1)A(t) ≥ δt and
∑∞
t=1 δt =∞ Gantmacher blocks converge to:
lim
t→∞ (A(t) · · ·A(0)) =

G1 0
. . .
0 Gg 0
n.c . . . n.c. 0

where g is the number of essential classes, nh is the cardinality of essential class h and Gh
are nh × nh row – stochastic consensus matrices, i.e. strictly positive stochastic matrices with
all rows equal:
Gh =

c1 c2 . . . cn
...
...
...
...
c1 c2 . . . cn
 =
 c1 c2 . . . cn

A.2.4 Opinion dynamics under bounded confidence
The inhomogenous case is often referred to as a time – variant model, in the sense that the
weights each agent puts onto other agents changes over time. However, a rule for the evolution
of the network topology must be established in order to analyze the system dynamics.
The main question in this case is whether the update rule will influence the reaching of a
stable opinion pattern or fragmentation (either consensus within subgroups or dissent across
different subgroups) will occur or even no convergence at all will be achieved.
Within this framework, “the most difficult type of model occurs if the weights depends
on opinions itself because then the model turns from a linear one to a non–linear one” (cit.
Hegselmann & Krause, 2005).
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In particular, we hereby examine a system with bounded confidence, in which agents update
their network interaction structure by putting weight on agents that have a similar opinion. The
system becomes non – linear in the sense that the averaging process can automatically include
or discard certain agents, hence underweighting certain opinions or overweighting other opinions
if they are similar.
We define a bounded confidence opinion dynamics process, as the system with initial opinion
vector x(0) and dynamics:
x(t+ 1) = A(t+ 1)x(t) = A(x(t), )x(t)
aij(t+ 1) :=
{
1
#I(i,x(t)) if j ∈ I(i,x(t))
0 otherwise
(13)
I(i,x(t)) = {j s.t. |xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ i}
This structure implies that, at each time t, every agent compares her opinion with that of
others, finding a subset of agents whose opinion does not differ too much from her. The agent
then assigns equal weight to these agents. The assumption of equal weights can be relaxed, but
it will not be analyzed in this work. More importantly, agent i herself lies in the set I, thus
leading to a positive diagonal at each time t.
The non – linearity in the model is due to the fact that the update rule enhances the
selection of similar opinions and implies discarding distant opinions. This approach naturally
brings to fragmentation and polarisation of opinions, meant as a hardening of opinion patterns.
Hegselmann & Krause (2005) describe, by simple examples, the possibility of splits between
subgroups that become essential and that reach consensus within the agents belonging to the
subgroup.
Simulations The models we have so far described are multi – faceted and computer simula-
tions can give better insights. Since the homogeneous case is of little interest in this work, and
it has been reported for sake of completeness, we refer to the non – linear bounded confidence
inhomogenous model in Equation 13 in the following simulations.
All simulations are for n = 100 agents. The number of simulations, unless otherwise stated,
is 1000. In the first part, the initial opinion vector x(0) is drawn from a uniform continous
random distribution with support [0, 1]. Figure 15 reports a simple one – run simulation with
different values of  (assumed to be equal for all agents). It is immediate to see that the higher
the , the higher the chances to achieve consensus. However, polarized situations (e.g.  = 0.20)
can be obtained, which show “hardening” in the opinions. When  = 0.40 a consensus is achieved
in a very limited number of time steps.
Figure 16 shows a tri – dimensional plot of the opinion space with respect to different values
of  once a stable configuration is achieved, the y axis is the average relative frequence over 1000
simulations. One can see how the higher the , the less fragmented the opinion pattern is.
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Figure 15: Single - run simulations
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Figure 16: Average relative frequencies of x ∈ [0, 1], n = 100 opinions (after stabilisation) for
different values of  (1000 simulations).
Distribution of the initial opinion profile Since in the non – linear bounded confidence
model the initial opinion profile can determine the degree of fragmentation of the opinion pat-
terns, it is interesting to conclude this Chapter by modifying the distribution of the initial
opinion profile x(0). Quite obviously, if the initial opinion profile is too dispersed (with respect
to the confidence level ), the initial fragmentation pattern will never converge to a consensus
or to a less fragmented pattern.
While still keeping the opinion range x(0) ∈ [0, 1], we will use an initial opinion profile from
random numbers drawn from a Beta distribution14.
A.3 Software and data
Data processing and simulations have been done in Python and Matlab. Tri – dimensional plots
have been exported to LATEXvia matlab2tikz.
15
Twitter (www.twitter.com) data have been retrieved and pre – processed (string and hashtag
recognition) in Python with Python Twitter16 (a Python wrapper around the Twitter API
14The pdf of a Beta distribution is given by
f(x; a, b) =
1
B(a, b)
xa−1(1− x)b−1,
where B(a, b) is the Beta function and a and b are the shape parameters of the distribution.
15http://www.mathworks.de/matlabcentral/fileexchange/22022-matlab2tikz/all_files
16The current analysis, as of May 2014, is done in Twython.
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(https://dev.twitter.com/) and double–checked via Twitty for Matlab.
Network visualizations are done with Gephi (https://gephi.org/).
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